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IN GIDEON'S WAKE: HARSHER PENALTIES 
AND THE "SUCCESSFUL" CRIMINAL APPELLANT 
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE* 
More striking is a field in which the law is still in a wholly rudimentary 
state; due process of law in post-conviction procedures, in sentencing 
and treatment, where we continue to live in a jungle of total discretion.1 
DURING his brief moment before the Supreme Court of the United States 
it appeared that Clarence Gideon might establish the constitutional principle 
of right to counsel only to lose a chance to secure his own freedom. The State 
of Florida argued that whether or not the Supreme Court were to overrule 
Betts v. Brady,2 and henceforth to require appointment of counsel in all felony 
trials of indigent defendants, such a decision should not be applied to Gideon 
· himsel£.3 The state maintained that Gideon had received full dtte process as 
defined by the Supreme Court as of· the time of his trial, and emphasized 
that Gideon's assault on Betts v. Brady was by way of collateral attack rather 
than direct appeal : "a decision reversing the ruling of the court below would 
necessarily be retroactive in effect."4 Such a decision might result in the re~ 
lease of 5,093 convicts in Florida, and countless thousands of others serving 
prison terms in the twelve other states which did not provide for appointed 
counsel absent special circumstances.G While many of these prisoners might 
*Professor of Law, Duke University; Senior Fellow, Yale Law School, 1964·65. 
1. Address by Paul M. Bator, Artilnr Garfield Hays Cottfcrcncc, March 7, 1963, 
printed in 10 WAYNE L. REv. 462-63 (1964). 
2. 316 U.S. 455 (1942), holding that the due process clause of the fourteenth amend· 
ment does not require appointment of counsel upon request by nn indigent, at the trltll 
stage of a felony proceeding, absent any special circumstances. Following Betts, and prior 
to Gideon, the "special circumstances" qualification had been enlarged to erode Belts, Sec, 
e.g., Chewning v. Cunningham, 368 U.S. 443 (1962) ; Hudson v. North Carolina, 363 U.S. 
697 (1960); Kamisar, Betts v. Brady Twmty Years Later: Tile Right to Cou11scl atul 
Due Process Values, 61 MICH. L. REv. 219, 278-80 (1962). 
3. Brief for Respondent, pp. 53-56, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), 
4. Id. at 55. It has been reported that by October, 1963, 3,000 prisoners ln Florida 
alone had filed petitions seeking review of their convictions on the authority of Gidcoll, 
Krash, The Right to a Lawyer: Tile Implicatiolls of Gidcou v. Waiuwrig!lt, 39 NorRC 
DAME LAw. 150, 154 (1964) ; Time, Oct. 18, 1963, p. 53. 
5. Kamisar, The Right to Co11usel and tile Fourteeutil Ameudmeut: A Dialogue 011 
"Tile Most Pervasive Right" of a11 Accttsed, 30 U. CHI. L. REv. 1, 274·75, App. I, 67~74 
(1962). While only five states (Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, and North and South Caro• 
!ina), refused counsel even when requested, Gidco11 has subsequently been regarded ns rc· 
quiring appointed counsel even when not requested. See, e.g., Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 
U.S. 202 (1964), reversing 175 Ohio St. 46, 191 N.E.2d 727, in which the Ohio Supreme 
Court refused to apply Gideon because the defendant had not originally requested counsel; 
Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524, 528, 530 (3d Cir. 1964). Thus, the then current 
practice of thirteen states was substantially affected by the decision in Gideoll v. Wai11~ 
wright. Other states were also affected, since some convicts in these states had been con• 
victed before the state provided for appointed counsel. 
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be subject to conviction a second time upon retrial, it was clear that a new 
trial would not be possible in every case; a number of convictions depended 
upon evidence no longer available. Thus, it was argued, to avoid the release 
of the guilty, any decision to overrule Betts should be written prospectively 
without interfering with Gideon's incarceration or that of others who were 
imprisoned following proceedings which afforded them due process as it was 
understood at the time. 
Though the Court in Gideon did not respond to Florida's importunity beyond 
providing for Gideon himself, 6 full retroactivity has since been accorded the 
Gideon decision, with the approval of the Supreme Court 1 Retroactive appli-
cation of Gideon follows the consistent holding of the Court that "men in-
carcerated in flagrant violation of their constitutional rights have a remedy"S 
6. Characteristically, the case was simply remanded for further action not irtconsistent 
with the Court's opinion - an order which might reasonably have left the Florida courts 
wondering whether a new trial was required. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). For useful discussions 
of the case, see LEWis, GmroN's TRUMPET (1964) ; Tuckor, The Supreme Court and ll:c 
Indige11t Defe11da11t, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 151, 162-71 (1964) ; Krash, supra note 4; Israel, 
Gideon v. Wai1~wright: The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP. CT. REv. 211; Allison & Sey-
mour, The Supreme Court aud the Doctriue of the Right of Cormscl, 46 J. AM. Jun. Soc'\" 
259 (1963); Kamisar, supra note 5; Kamisar, supra note 2; Comment. The Riglrt lo 
Counsel: Evolution or Revolrttion i1~ the Crimiual Law, 12 KAN. L. REv. 525 (1964) ; 
Note, The Supreme Cortrt, 1962 Term, 77 HARv. L REv. 61, 103-05 (1963). 
7. Doughty v. Maxwell, 376 U.S. 202 (1964) ; Pickelsimer v. Wainwright, 375 U.S. 
2 (1963); United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1964), ccrl. denied sub nom. 
LaVallee v. Durocher, 84 S. Ct. 1921 (1964); Craig v. Myers, 329 F.2d 856 (3d Cir. 
1964); Palumbo v. New Jersey, 334 F.2d 524 (3d Cir. 1964). See also Striker v. Fancher, 
317 F.2d 780, 783-84 (6th Cir. 1963) ; Nolan v. Nash, 316 F.2d 776, 777 (8th Cir. 1963); 
Commonwealth v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 515, 204 A.2d 439 (1964) ; Goodfellow v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 
528, 204 A.2d 446 (1964) ; Note, The Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARv. L REv. 177, 
181-87 (1964). 
8. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 123 (1956). See also Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 
368, 406 (1964) (Black, J., dissenting). 
[I]f I thought that submitting the issue of voluntariness (of a confession) to the 
jury really denied the kind of trial commanded by the Constitution, I would not 
hesitate to reverse on that ground even if it meant overturning convictions in every 
State, instead of in just about one-third of them. 
To be sure, the Court has never forthrightly addressed itself in any majority opinion 
to the constitutional necessity of applying an overruling constitutional decision retroo.cti\'e-
ly. See Jackson v. Denno, supra at 406 (dissenting opinion); Pickelsimer v. \Vainwright, 
375 U.S. 2, 4 (1964) (dissenting opinion). On the other hand, it has uniformly granted 
or otherwise approved retroactive application each time an occasion has arisen. See, 
e.g., Fahy v. Connecticut. 375 U.S. 85 (1963) [applying Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 
(1961), to facts and a trial which occurred prior to the decision in Mapp, the case being 
on appeal when Mapp was decided]; Novell v. Illinois, 373 U.S. 420, 424-25 (1963), Reck 
v. Ragen, 367 U.S. 433 (1961), Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), and Eskridge v. 
Washington State Prison Bel., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) [applying Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 
12 (1956) retroactively]; Smith v. Crouse, 378 U.S. 584 (1964), [applying Douglas v. 
California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) retroactively]; Walker v. Jolmston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941) 
[applying Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) retroactively]. 
For discussions regarding the constitutional necessity and appropriateness of applying 
overruling constitutional decisions retroactively, see Meador, Habeas Corpus and the 
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regardless of when the incarceration occurred. Because of state practices in 
retrying and re-prosecuting, however, the anomalous situation has arisen that 
the principal beneficiaries of retroactive overruling constitutional decisions 
are those who may be guilty even according to a determination by current 
due process standards, but who cannot be effectively prosecuted again. And 
those more recently convicted or othenvise convicted under circumstances 
where reprosecution is feasible are frequently disabled from securing a determiM 
nation of their constitutional complaints. 
A demonstration of this paradox lies in the wake of Gideon v. Waimvrigllt. 
In urging that an overruling of Betts v. Brady could be made retroactive £or 
Gideon's benefit, without "releasing indeterminate numbers of prisoners in 
some states," Gideon's Supreme Court brief opened with the following highly 
practical observation: 
First, it must be noted that a defendant who obtains a reversal of his 
conviction may be retried for the offense of which he was convicted .••• 
Moreover, it is possible that an even more severe sentence than that origM 
inally levied may be imposed at the conclusion of the second trial.D 
The implication was that the Supreme Court need not be troubled by a retroM 
active decision in Gideon's case, for many persons held in prison under conM 
victions obtained without benefit of defense counsel would be deterred from 
seeking any relief from fear of even harsher sentences upon retrial and conM 
viction. 
Prisoners in North Carolina, one of the five states which did not appoint 
counsel in all felony cases even when requested, quickly learned just what 
this meant. One of those prisoners was Sam Williams, an indigent convicted 
of larceny on February 19, 1963, without benefit of appointed counsel. He 
was sentenced to two years in prison and immediately began to serve that 
term. Following the decision in Gideon, Williams secured a new trial, held 
on July 29, 1963. He was again convicted. This time, however, he was sentenced 
to the maximum of ten years and denied credit for time previously served, and 
he necessarily lost "good time" points which he had accumulated toward securM 
Retroactivity Illusion, 50 VA. L. REv. 1115 (1964); Tucker, The StiPrcmc Court atrd the 
Indigent Defendant, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 151, 177-78 (1964) ; Torcia & King, The Mirage 
of Retroactivity and Changing Constitutional Concepts, 66 DicK. L. REv. 269 (1962); 
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty Stales, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 340-41 (1962) ; 
Bender, Retroactive Effect of an Overneling Constitutional Decision: Mapp v. Ollio, 110 
U. PA. L. REv. 650, 668 (1962); Note, Prospective Overruli11g and Retroactive APPitca• 
tion i" the Federal Courts, 71 YALE L.J. 907, 942-43 (1962); Morris, The Etrd of all 
Experimentin Federalism- A Note 011 Mapp v. Ohio, 36 WAsH. L. REv. 407, 432 (1961) j 
Note, The Effect of Overruling Prior Judgmmls 011 Constitutional Issues, 43 VA. L. REv. 
1279 (1957) ; Note, The Effect of Griffin v. Illinois on tl1e States' Adminislralioll of t!lc 
Criminal Law, 25 U. Cux. L. REv. 161 (1957) ; Note, Collateral Altack of Pre-Mapp v. 
Ollio Conviction Based on Illegally Obtained Evidence i11 State Co11rts, 16 RUtGEttS L. 
REv. 587, 593-94 (1952) ; Snyder, Retrospective Operation of Ovcrrtlliii!J Dccisious, 35 
ILL. L. REv. 121 (1940). 
9. Brief for Petitioner, p. 44, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
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ing early parole. The North Carolina Supreme Court affirmed per cllriam.10 Ha.d 
Williams done nothing about his original unconstitutional conviction, he would 
have been imprisoned no more than two years. Retrial and resentencing at 
the instance of the state, or even a modification of the original sentence upon 
I!}.."Piration of the trial court's term could not have followed.u For foolishly 
insisting upon his right to counsel and foolishly utilizing postconviction rem-
edies, however, Williams now may languish in prison up to ten and one-half 
years. The point will surely not be lost on other North Carolina prisoners. 
The grimness of the joke will be most enjoyed, however, by those prisoners 
for whom re-prosecution presents no real danger because of the dissipation of 
the state's evidence against them; they, of course, will be undeterred from 
securing their unconditional release under the retroactive application of Gideon 
v. Wainwright. 
The Williams sequel to Gideon is a near duplicate of the sequel to J olmson 
v. ZerbstP which nominally established an indigent's right to appointed counsel 
in all felony cases originating in the federal courts. The year after J ollnson v. 
Zerbst was decided, a federal prisoner named Thomas H. Robinson applied 
for habeas corpus because his original plea of guilty, entered two years before 
the Zerbst decision, had been made without benefit of appointed counsel. His 
10. State v. Williams, 261 N.C. 172, 134 S.E.2d 163 (1964). See also State v. White, 
262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964), cert. denied, 33 U.S.L. WEEK 3266 (Feb. 2, 1965). In 
dicta, in Williams, the court said there was no error even if \Villiams was convicted the 
second time of a graver offense for which he originally had been tried but not convicted. 
Compare Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 (1957) (similar situation, Court held 
double jeopardy) ; In re Hess, 45 Cal. 2d 171, 288 P .2d 5 (1955) ; Gomez v. Superior Ct., 
50 Cal. 2d 640, 328 p .2d 976 (1958). 
11. The North Carolina Constitution does not contain an e.-q>ress double jeop3l'dy 
clause, but the North Carolina courts have inferred the usual protection from art. 1, § 17 
of the state constitution. See State v. Birckhead, 256 N.C. 494, 124 S.E.2d 838 (1962) ; 
State v. Crocker, 239 N.C. 446, 80 S.R2d 243 (1954); State v. :Mansfield, 207 N.C. 233, 
176 S.R 761 (1934); State v. Clemmons, 207 N.C. 276, 176 S.R 760 (1934). The full 
import of the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment is not yet a feature of pro-
cedural due process equally applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment See 
Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) ; Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958) ; 
Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571 (1958) ; Brock v. North Carolina, 344 U.S. 424 (1953) ; 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) ; United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922) ; 
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847). Nevertheless, many of the same cases make 
it perfectly plain that double jeopardy considerations play a substantial role in the deter-
mination of due process. Palko v. Connecticut, SII/Jra at 323; Brock v. North Carolina, 
supra at 428-29, 435, 438; Haag v. New Jersey, s11pra at 467; Louisiana ez rei. Francis v. 
Resweber, 329 U.S. 457, 462 (1947), rehearing denied, 330 U.S. 853. If he uses appropri:lte 
sentencing standards, a trial judge in North Carolina may modify and increase a sentence 
during the same term of court, State v. Godwin, 210 N.C. 447, 187 S.R 560 (1937) ; 
In re Brittain, 93 N.C. 587 (1885). He may not do so, however, merely because the defend-
ant attempted to appeal his conviction. State v. Patton, 221 N.C. 117, 19 S.E.2d 142 (1942). 
Compare State v. Bostic, 242 N.C. 639, 89 S.E.2d 261 (1955). See also United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ; Ez parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873) ; United States 
v. Rosenstreich, 204 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.1953). 
12. 304 u.s. 458 (1938). 
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original sentence had been life imprisonment. Upon retrial and conviction for 
the same offense, he was sentenced to death.18 
The Williams and Robinson cases are not isolated occurrences. Harsher 
sentences following reconviction of successful appellants are permissible 
throughout the federal courts 14 and in the vast majority of the states.1rl The 
rationales which support the practice are several. In some jurisdictions it is 
asserted that the prior sentence has no legal e."'tistence whatever because it 
was imposed pursuant to a "void" conviction.16 More typically, it is said that 
by utilizing a postconviction remedy the defendant waived any benefit he may 
have had from the prior sentence.17 In other jurisdictions it is said that the 
appellate court has no authority to revise a sentence imposed by a trial court 
within statutory limits,l8 and that the defendant should look to the executive 
13. Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392 (6th Cir. 1944), af]'d, 324 U.S. 282 
(1945). In affirming, the Supreme Court did not consider any objection directed to the 
harsher sentence. 
14. See, e.g., Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, rehrari11g denied, 251 U.S. 380 
(1920) ; Robinson v. United States, s11Pra note 13; King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291 
(D.C. Cir. 1938); Bryant v. United States, 214 Fed. 51 (8th Cir. 1914). But sec Buhler 
v. Hill, 7 F. Supp. 857 (M.D. Pa. 1934) ; and dicta in United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 
304, 307 (1931); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 167-74 (1873); 
15. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155 (1900) ; Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 471·72 
(1963) (dictum, dissenting opinion); Kring v. Missouri, 107 U.S. 221, 225 (1882) (dictum). 
A catalogue of state cases is presented in Agata, Tima Served 1mder a R~n•ers£'d Sentence 
or Convictio1~ - A Proposal and a Basis for Decision, 25 MoNT. L. REV. 3 (1963); 
Whalen, Resentence Without Credit For Time Served: Unequal Protection of the Laws, 
35 MINN. L. REV. 239 (1951); Annot., 35 A.L.R2d 1283 (1954); Note, 50 VA. L. Rtv. 
562-63 nn.ll, 12 (1964) ; Note, 77 HARV. L. REv. 1272 (1964) ; Note, 45 Mtcn. L. REv. 
912 (1947). Typical cases are In re De Meerleer, 323 Mich. 287, 35 N.W.2d 255 (1948), 
cert. denied, 336 U.S. 946 (1949) ; McDowell v. State, 225 Ind. 495, 76 N.E.2d 249 (1947) ; 
People v. Starks, 395 Ill. 567, 71 N.E.2d 23 (1947), cert. denied, 334 U.S. 821 (1948); 
Ex parte Wilkerson, 76 Okla. Crim. 204, 135 P.2d 507 (1943); Drankovich v. Murphy, 
248 Wis. 433, 22 N.W.2d 540 (1946). B11t see People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 4821 386 
P.2d 677 (1963); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Va. 250, 46 S.E.2d 406 (1948). 
16. See, e.g., Ex parte Wilkerson, S11Pra note 15; Minto v. State, 9 Ala. App. 95, 64 
So. 369 (1913). Whalen, st~Pra note 15, at 240-43, cuts through the fatuous claim that 
because a sentence is "void" for some purposes, e.g., to permit collateral attack, the time 
the defendant has spent confined in prison simply doesn't exist in the eye o£ the law. 
The Government's brief suggests, in the vein of The Mikado, that because tltc first 
sentence was void appellant "has served no sentence but has merely spent time in 
the penitentiary;" that since he should not have been imprisoned as he was, he was 
not imprisoned at all. The brief deduces the corollary that his non-existent punish· 
ment cannot possibly be "increased." As other corollaries it might be suggested Utnt 
he is liable in quasi-contract for the value of his board and lodging, and criminally 
liable for obtaining them by false pretenses. 
King v. United States, 98 F.2d 291, 293-94 (D.C. Cir. 1938). 
17. See the federal cases cited in note 14 supra; Kohlfuss v. Warden, 149 Conn. 692, 
183 A.2d 626, cert. denied, 371 U.S. 928 (1962) ; 15 AM. Jun. 89, Crimit1al Law § 427 
(1938). 
18. See, e.g., In re De Meerleer, 323 Mich. 287, 35 N.W .2d 255 (1948) ; People v. 
Judd, 396 Ill. 211, 71 N.E.2d (1947); In re Docile, 323 Mich. 241, 35 N.W.2d 251 
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department for an exercise of clemency power. Elsewhere, in rejecting double 
jeopardy claims, courts have held with Justice Holmes that a new trial and sen-
tence is simply a continuation of the same case, and thus the previous sentence 
of the defendant does not foreclose independent consideration of an appropriate 
sentence at a second trial in that case.111 
It is the burden of this article, however, that harsher sentences of the type 
imposed in tlie Williams and Robinson cases are unconstitutional whether 
imposed by federal or state courts, and that support for this conclusion lies 
in three constitutional provisions or principles. 
The rule contended for will operate to prevent an increase in the original 
sentence whether that increase would be accomplished directly by raising the 
sentence, or indirectly by imposing a sentence which is harsher because it 
denies credit for time previously served, or because it denies good conduct 
points accumulated under the previous sentence.20 Similarly, it will make no 
difference under the rule whether the original or subsequent sentence is im-
posed by a jury, a judge, or some other sentencing authority. The contention 
is, rather, that in all cases an original operative sentence within statutory 
limits and free of error prejudicial to the government must be regarded as 
a ceiling in any subsequent proceeding on the same offense, where the second 
trial is occasioned by a successful challenge to the original proceeding on con-
stitutional grounds. 
The original sentence, it 'vill be argued, operates as a ceiling under these 
circumstances whether or not the second sentencing authority C3Il be shown 
to have augmented the original sentence solely because the defendant insisted 
upon a fair trial. If such a showing could be made, the task of setting aside 
(1948), leave to file originlll petitio!~ for habeas corp11s de11ied, 336 U.S. 942 (1949). See 
also cases and discussion in Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 422 (1961). Compare Short v. United 
States, United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960); Euziere v. United States, 
249 F.2d 293 (lOth Cir.1957). 
19. The contention ordinarily appears with the "waiver" cases previously cited, and 
is built on Holmes' dissent in Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134-37 (1904), sub-
stantially adopted for fourteenth amendment purposes in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
319 (1937). 
20. It would not accomplish our purpose to argue only that credit for "good time" and 
all time previously served must be allowed, but that the second sentence is not othcnvise 
limited by the first sentence. Unless the original sentence \vithin statutory limits operntes 
as a maximum from which credit for time already served is also deducted, the clog on 
defendant's right to a fair trial resulting from the risk of a harsher sentence remains for 
all those originally sentenced below the ma..-.dmum. 
The unacceptable compromise is nicely iiiustrated by the Florida practice. Credit for 
"gain time'' and time already served must be allowed by the second sentence. Vellucci v. 
Cochran, 138 So. 2d 510 (1962) ; Tilgbman v. Mayo, 82 So. 2d 136 (1955) ; Harvey v. 
Mayo, 72 So. 2d 385 (1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 965 (1955). On the other band, the 
second sentence can be increased beyond the first sentence. Rhoden v. Chaplllllll, 127 Fla. 
9, 172 So. 56 (1937). The net result is that the allowance of credit may be a complete 
illu~ion; the second judge imposing sentence simply increases the sentence by an amount 
greater than he then deducts as an allowance for time previously served. An eleg:mt study 
in this type of judicial cynicism is Little v. Wainwright, 161 So. 2d 213 (1964). 
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the e.. .... cess of the second sentence would of course be simpler; the most orthodox 
teachings of equal protection would hold that harsher treatment of persons 
solely because they successfully pursued available postconviction remedies 
to test constitutional claims bears no rational connection with any legitimate 
governmental interest.21 Such cases, however, are understandably few in num· 
ber 22 and their easy resolution would not represent any significant ameli ora· 
tion of the main problem. After all, even when the suspicion is well founded 
that such a consideration was consciously employed, it will ordinarily be 
impossible to prove the point; the judge, jury, or other sentencing authority 
is unlikely to announce that it has added to the defendant's term solely from 
a sense of antagonism to those who insist upon a fundamentally fair trial. 
The limitation against harsher resentencing will apply regardless of the 
manner in which the defendant secured a new trial. It will make no difference 
for our purposes whether the error was successfully raised by direct appeal, 
by collateral attack in the state courts made available by such devices as coram 
nobis or state habeas corpus, or by collateral attack in any appropriate federal 
court. 
Finally, while the original sentence is to be regarded as a ceiling under the 
circumstances described, we shall not argue that defendant's interest in a 
constitutionally fair trial and an untrammeled testing of his constitutional claim 
should carry so far as to require his unconditional release should he be sue· 
cessful on appeal of his original conviction. What we say here will not prevent 
society from trying and convicting him again in an error-free proceeding. 
Self-evident as this qualification might seem, it nonetheless distinguishes a 
number of cases in which the essential merit of defendant's position was ob-
21. Dowd v. United States es rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 
316 U.S. 255 (1942); United States v. Wiley, 278 F.2d 500 (7th Cir. 1960), properly noted 
as an equal protection case in Note, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 422, 425-26 (1961). The fact that 
the sentence is within statutory limits makes absolutely no difference, of course, if it ls 
manifest that the harshness of the sentence actually imposed was due solely to invidious 
or arbitrary considerations : 
Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it ls 
applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand 
..• the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution. 
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886). See also People v. Harris, 182 Cnl. 
App. 2d Supp. 837, 5 Cal. Rptr. 852 (App. Dept., L.A. County Ct. 1960) ; Bargain City 
U.S.A., Inc. v. Dilworth, 407 Pa. 129, 179 A2d 439 (1962); Wade v. City and County of 
San Francisco, 82 Cal. App. 2d 337, 186 P .2d 181 (1947) ; People v. Orcck, 74 Cal. App. 
2d 215, 168 P.2d 186 (1946). 
22. In none of the many cases cited in notes 12-16 .sttPra was it contended that tho 
harsher sentence was deliberately imposed solely as punishment for successfully appealing 
the original conviction. For illustrations of the difficulty in establishing such a contention, 
see Nichols v. United States, 106 Fed. 672, 678-79 (8th Cir. 1901). The difficulty of apply• 
ing Yick Wo v. Hopkins to discretionary functions, in the absence of a clear discrimina-
tory pattern or an e.xpress disclosure of discriminatory purpose, is futly treated in Com-
ment, The Right to Nondiscriminatory Enforcemmt of State Pc11al Lau1s, 61 CoLUM. L. 
REv. 1103 (1961). See also Note, Appellate Review of Seutcnci11g Procedure, 74 YALt! 
L.J. 379 (1964). 
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scured by his unavailing effort to take advantage of a more doubtful and farther-
reaching double jeopardy argument. Nor will the considerations which require 
that the original sentence operate as a ceiling apply when the second trial is 
occasioned by successful appeal of a state, rather than by the defendant. Palko 
v. Connecticut 23 is not necessarily affected by anything to be said here. 
UNREASONABLE CoNDITIONS AND THE RIGHT OF FAIR TRIAL 
The initial argument we shall consider applies only to the situation of the 
Gideon-type defendant who has successfully challenged his conviction on 
constitutional grounds. The essential persuasion itself is easily stated: the sub-
jection of the defendant to the risk of a harsher penalty upon retrial and con-
viction for the same offense, as a condition of receiving a fundamentally fair 
trial, is an unconstitutional condition on his right to a fair trial. It forces him 
to surrender his constitutional rights, and it does not serve any counter-
vailing, legitimate public policy.24 In order to protect the right to a fair trial, 
an original sentence whieh the state may no longer challenge of its O\'m accord, 
must operate as a ceiling for any sentence subsequently imposed, following the 
successful appeal and retrial of the accused for the same offense. !!l:i 
23. 302 u.s. 319 (1937). 
24. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963) ; Green v. United States. 355 U.S. 184 
(1957) ; Short v. United States, People v. Henderson, 35 Cat Rptr. 77, 386 P .2d 677 
(1963). Regarding the Henderson case, see Note, 50 VA. L REv. 559 (1954); Note, 1954 
DUKE L.J. 915; Note, 9 Vn..r.. L. REv. 517 (1954) ; Note, 16 STAN. L REv. 1103 (1954). 
25. The right to a fundamentally fair trial is, of course, a function of the fourteenth 
amendment and of the fifth, sixth and seventh amendments. Whether one also has a 
constitutional right to appeal certain issues in a criminal case has never been decided. 
For reasons of a historical nature, the Supreme Court has repeatedly denied that the 
fourteenth amendment guarantees any appeaL Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 365 
(1963) (dictum, dissenting opinion); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12. 18, 2l.,(concurring 
opinion), 27 (dissenting opinion) (1956) (dicta); McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 
687-88 (1894) (dicta). It is arguable, however, that due process of law requires an adeqiiZlte 
opportunity for at least one impartial hearing of a claim that one is being held in prison 
in violation of his constitutional rights, whether that hearing be supplied by appeal, some 
other postconviction remedy within the state, or federal habeas corpus. See Bator, Finality 
in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corplls for Stale Prisot1ers, 76 HARv. L REv. 441 
(1963); Reitz, Federal Habeas Corpus: Poslcon1!iction Remedy for State Prisoners, 103 
U. PA. L. REv. 461 (1960). The Supreme Court has suggested that failure of a state to 
provide any adequate postconviction means of testing substantial federal questions may 
constitute a denial of due process. Young v. Ragen, 337 U.S. 235, 236-39 (1949); New 
York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 689, 692 (1943); Mooney v. Holohan, 
294 U.S. 103, 110-13 (1935) ; Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 90-91 (1923). See also 
Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 713 (1961). On this basis, it is arg~~Z~ble that no post-
conviction remedy is "adequate" if its availability is conditioned upon the willingness of 
the applicant to forego whatever protection would otherwise be provided by his sentence. 
The fact that history is against the determination of such a constitutional right, other than 
what is implied in Art. I, § 9 regarding habeas corpus, is not conclusive. Compare New 
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); and see Pedrick, Freedom of Tile 
Press and the Law of Libel: The .Modem Revised Translation, 49 CoRNELL LQ. 581, 586 
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The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions generally holds that enjoyment 
of governmental benefits may not be conditioned upon the waiver or relin~ 
quishment of constitutional rights, at least in the absence of compelling societal 
interests which justify the subordination of such rights under the circum~ 
stances.26 It has been held, for e.'{ample, that a state cannot compel a person 
to surrender fourteenth amendment rights of belief, speech and association, 
in order to enjoy special p.rivileges of property tax exemption available to 
others.27 In this and similar cases the state was admittedly free wholly to 
withhold a benefit it had no constitutional obligation affirmatively to provide. 
n. 20 (1964). Compare Brown v. Board of F..duc. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); rutd see Biclccl, 
The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955). See 
also Wofford, The Blinding Light: The Uses of History in Constitutional Interpretation, 
31 u. CHI. L. REv. 502 (1964). 
There is another alternative as well. Conceding that no state is required to provide n 
postconviction remedy even to test constitutional claims, the accused still has a number 
of federal postconviction opportunities, e.g., direct appeal or certiorari to the Supreme 
Court under certain circumstances, and habeas corpus in an appropriate federal district 
court. Since the successful pursuit of these federal remedies would still confront the ac· 
cused with a state rule subjecting him to the risk of harsher resentencing fotlowing n 
second conviction for the same offense, he may be substantially deterred from pursuing 
remedies which Congress intended to provide for him. To the extent that the state's 
rule therefore operates to frustrate federally established postconviction remedies, it may 
be vulnerable to challenge under the Supremacy Clause. 
In what follows in this article, however, we assume only that the defendant has con· 
stitutional immunity from serious criminal punishment inflicted without the observance 
of procedural due process, i.e., that he has a constitutional right to a fair trial. For the 
sake of argument, we shall assume that any right of appeal is of a statutory nature only, 
26. See Cramp v. Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 288 (1961); Torcaso v. Wat• 
kins, 367 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1961) ; Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) : 
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519-20 (1958) ; Slochower v. Bd. of Higher Educ., 350 
U.S. 551 (1.256) ; Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) ; Hague v. CIO, 307 
U.S. 496 (1939); Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Comm., 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); 
Terral v. Burke Const Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Kansas, 216 
U.S. 1 (1910); Dixon v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 294 F.Zd 150, 156, cerl. denied, 368 U.S, 
930 (1961); Heilberg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405 (N.D. Cal. 1964), ccrt. granted, 33 U.S.L. 
WEEK 3262 (1965) ; Danskin v. San Diego Unified School Dist., 28 Cal. 2d 536, 171 P.2d 
885 (1946). In each of these cases, a state unsuccessfully attempted to withhold a privilege 
unless the party interested in that privilege submitted to some restriction of a constitutional 
right which the state was powerless to impose directly. The cases involving the unconM 
stitutionally convicted are far more flagrant. For in these cases, the state has by hypothesis 
already deprived a person of a constitutional right, t•ia., the right to a fair trial, but it 
refuses to undo the harm unless the man in prison is willing to relinquish still another 
right, viz., a statutory right against having his punishment increased, as a condition of 
correcting its original unconstitutional misconduct. 
For other cases and discussions of unconstitutional conditions, see Greene v. McElroy, 
360 U.S. 474 (1959) ; Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327 U.S. 146, 155-56 (1946) ; Goldsmith 
v. Bd. of Tax Apps., 270 U.S. 117 (1926); Note, Unconstillltional Cotrditiotls, 73 HAnv. 
L. REv. 1595 (1960); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 
CoLUM. L. REv. 321 (1935); Merrill, Unconstillltional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 
(1929). 
27. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
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In electing to provide that benefit, however, the state was not free to do so 
in a manner which practically operated to abridge constitutional rights. In 
each case, the invalid abridgment resulted not from a direct prohibition of 
the right, but from subjecting the adversely affected party to an unreasonable 
dilemma - a choice free in law but not free in fact - to suffer a loss of 
constitutional freedom or forego benefits which those with fewer scruples 
might enjoy. Understandably, the Supreme Court has taken the position that 
government may not use its wealth and power ineluctably to erode constitu-
tional rights of those too weak to resist temptation, too indifferent to their 
own welfare, or too cynical to care. It has maintained, rather, that restrictions 
on the availability of governmental benefits must be independently justified 
by compelling societal interests substantially connected with such limitations. 
The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions is applicable to the rights of 
the unconstitutionally convicted in the following fashion: although the state 
and federal governments possess authority, as an original proposition, to re-
vise and to increase sentences of the criminally convicted,28 it is currently the 
law in every jurisdiction that no sentence may in fact be reopened for revision 
once the term of the trial court has expired, service of sentence has commenced, 
and the time for an appeal by the state (where such is allowed at all) has 
elapsed. Thus, immunity from an increased sentence is currently a protective 
feature of every state's criminal law. Defendants who passively remain in jail 
are assured at least that their sentences will not be increased; their original 
sentences describe the maximum period they must serve in prison, time 
actually served is necessarily credited against their sentences, and good con-
duct points earned are accumulated toward securing early parole. The right 
to a fundamentally fair trial is itself a constitutional right based on the due 
process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. Meaningful protection 
of that right forbids government, in the absence of important public interests, 
from conditioning its exercise upon the waiver - e.'\."Press or implied - of 
the protection against harsher sentencing to whiclt one would be entitled if 
he did not insist upon that right. 
It is true, of course, that the risk of harsher resentencing which is borne by 
those who appeal on constitutional grounds is no greater than the risk which 
is borne by those who appeal on nonconstitutional grounds. These otlter 
appellants include a larger number of persons whose convictions may suffer 
from error reversible only because state law so provides, and not because 
the error is of constitutional magnitude - for e.'miDple, misrulings on hear-
say or erroneous jury instructions, which offend the state's law of criminal 
procedure or evidence, but which are not so fundamental as to constitute 
a denial of fifth or fourteenth amendment procedural due process. Since these 
appellants were not denied a fair trial in the constitutional sense, it cannot be 
said that to require them to waive the protection provided by their original 
28. Subject only to certain double jeopardy restrictions against multiple punishment 
and harassing procedures, discussed in text accompanying notes 46-47 infra. 
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sentences as a condition of appeal is to restrict, abridge, or discourage their 
constitutional right to a fundamentally fair trial. By hypothesis, they have had 
the benefit of that right. As to them, implied waiver operates only to abridge 
a nonconstitutional, state-provided right to a trial more circumspect than that 
required by the fourteenth amendment. Constitutional protection against harsher 
resentencing of these persons thus cannot be located in the right to a funda-
mentally fair trial (although it may arise separately from the double jeopardy 
or equal protection clauses, which are discussed hereafter). Similarly, in the 
one state where all convicts may apply for a sentence revision without im-
pugning their conviction on any basis,29 and where that application may result 
in an increased sentence, the risk of the increased sentence has no deterrent 
effect on the right to a fundamentally fair trial. 
As to those originally denied a constitutionally fair trial, however, the rc· 
quirement of waiver of protection othenvise provided by their original sen· 
tences operates to discourage the exercise of a constitutional right. The cases 
involving the unconstitutionally convicted are simultaneously more subtle and 
more flagrant than the usual cases in which the doctrine of unconstitutional 
conditions has been applied. They are more subtle because they reverse the 
technique of waiver. In the more usual case, the individual is required to sur-
render a constitutional right as a condition of holding onto some non-constitu-
tional privilege. In Wieman v. Updegraff,30 for instance, the individual was 
required to surrender his constitutional right to political association as a con• 
clition of holding onto the nonconstitutional privilege of public employment. 
In the cases we are to consider, however, the individual is required to surrender 
a nonconstitutional privilege as a condition of securing a constitutional right, 
i.e., he is forced to give up whatever immunity is provided by his original 
sentence as a condition of securing a fair trial. 
In fact, however, these cases are more flagrant. For at the time the issue 
of waiver arises, the state has by hypothesis already deprived the accused o£ 
his constitutional right to a fair trial, and it attempts to condition his immunity 
from the risk of having his sentence increased upon his willingness not to 
assert that right. If such a requirement or condition is not to be unconstitutional 
under the circumstances, it can only be because it is justified through some 
substantial connection with compelling public interests which cannot othenvise 
be adequately protected. 
Possible offsetting societal interests which could not be adequately served 
unless unlimited waiver were conclusively presumed, must, according to the 
cases, be "compelling" rather than merely "legitimate." Moreover, the con· 
nection of these compelling interests with the requirement of waiver must be 
"substantial" rather than merely "rational." Whatever the ultimate wisdom of 
29. Connecticut. See Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A 
Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE L.J.1453 (1960). 
30. 344 u.s. 183 (1952). 
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the distinction, the Supreme Court has steadfastly required more by way of 
justification and nexus to sustain abridgments of personal liberty than it has 
in the regulation of economic prerogatives.31 The right to a fundamentally fair 
trial is, of course, at the very core of civil liberties. It is a right without which 
even the most jealous protection of preferred liberties, such as speech or 
privacy, would be undercut. Thus, it can only be subordinated, if at all, to 
the most compelling and necessary public regulations. 
Since harsher resentencing of the unconstitutionally convicted has never 
been attacked as an instance of an unconstitutional condition which unreasonably 
impairs the right to a fair trial, the courts have had no occasion to defend 
state practices condoning the principle of implied waiver against this specific 
objection.32 We can only speculate, therefore, as to the possible offsetting 
societal interests which the states might bring forward in arguing that implied 
waiver is a necessary concept even though it may operate to discourage the 
right to a fair trial. Even with the benefit of considerable conjecture it will be 
seen that none of these interests is sufficiently compelling or so incapable of 
accomplishment by alternative means which do not affect the right to a fair 
trial as to justify the intimidating effect of the practice which they seek to 
rationalize. 
31. Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955), and Day-Brite 
Lighting Co. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952), and West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 
379 (1937), aiU:l Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), with Shelton v. Tucker, 364 
U.S. 479 (1960), a11d Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), a11d Slochower v. Board of 
Higher Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956), and Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), and 
West Vrrginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). See also McLaughlin v. 
Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283, 288-89, 291 (1964) ; United States v. Carotene Prods. Co., 304 
u.s. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 
32. There are several plausible eA"Planations other than the possibility of oversight 
to account for the failure of counsel to have presented a challenge against harsher second 
sentences in terms of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. First, only a few of the 
cases in which a harsher second sentence was challenged resulted from a successful appeal 
based on a claim of con.stihttional right, and it is only these cases to ·which the doctrine 
is relevant. See cases cited in notes 14 and 15 supra. Second, because the technique of 
waiver employed in these cases reverses the two items to which it applies, the fact that 
the doctrine of unconstitutional condition may still be relevant is not as readily apparent 
as it ordinarily would be. See te.'d: following note 27 sttpra. Third, a. number of state 
. courts defended the permissibility of harsher second sentences without reference to 
waiver - e.g., they indiscriminately relied upon a mistaken notion that the first sentence 
was altogether "void" and not merely void in the sense of being subject to colhtcral 
attack. The history and illegitimacy of the void sentence doctrine is adequately re-
viewed in Whalen, Resmtence without Credit for Time Served: Unequal Protection 
of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. REv. 239, 240-43 (1951). See also note 24 supra. To the 
eA1:ent that this basis, rather than waiver, is employed as a defense for the permissibility 
of harsher resentencing, the following discussion in the te.'\.1: of this article may appropri-
ately be recast in terms of the void sentence doctrine imposing an unconstitutional burden, 
rather than an unconstitutional condition on the appellant. It is, in addition, subject to the 
cogent objections which Whalen raises in his article. 
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Certainly it would not be persuasive for a state to maintain, for instance, 
that the monetary or personnel cost of entertaining postconviction constitu-
tional claims in the state and federal courts will justify such an eccentric 
means of effecting economies by discouraging appeals. There is no evidence 
that costs have been high in those few jurisdictions which currently forbid 
harsher resentencing,33 and surely the review of constittetional complaints of 
convicts, and their opportunity to have a fair trial are as important as the 
run-of-the-mill diversity suits in the federal courts, and the legions of ordinary 
civil cases contending for attention on state court dockets - cases in which 
personal liberty and due process claims are not at stake. 
Neither is it maintainable that the rule operates as a fair and sensible means 
of limiting the retroactive effect of overruling constitutional decisions. This, 
it would seem, is not a legitimate goal for the state in the light of consistent 
constitutional doctrine that such constitutional decisions shall be applied retro· 
actively. As the circuit court reasoned in Craig v. Myer, affirming the grant 
of a habeas petition to a Gideon-type defendant originally convicted in 1931 : 
In actuality, all criminal convictions, all appellate judgments reversing 
convictions and, most notably, all judgments sustaining collateral attacks 
on convictions impose legal consequences upon the basis of the court's 
present legal evaluation of past conduct. It is irrelevant that the judge's 
views of what constitutes a denial of due process may have changed since 
the occurrence of the events in suit, or that he or some other judge might 
have rendered a different decision had the same matter reached his court 
years earlier. The petitioner is entitled to the most competent and informed 
decision the judge can now make whether there was fundamental unfair-
ness in his past conviction. Our system is not so unenlightened as to require 
that in attaching present consequences to 1931 occurrences, a judge must 
ignore all the insight that men learned in the law and observant of human 
behavior have acquired concerning the essentials of tolerable criminal 
procedure during the past 30 years.84 
In all of these cases - where the constitutional defect goes to the funda-
mental fairness of the trial as it bears upon the guilt or innocence of the ac-
cused - it would appear unreasonable not to give retroactive effect to over· 
ruling constitutional decisions. If lack of counsel, a financially interested judge, 
or an overreaching prosecutor, for instance, are deemed to make the rislc of 
conviction greater than due process requires the defendant to assume, surely 
persons held in prison as a result of such defective procedures should generally 
33. It is significant that harsher resentencing and the denial of credit for time prcvi• 
ously served are forbidden in the military. See UNIFORM CoDE OF MtuTARY JusTICE, Art, 
63(b), 60 Stat. 127, 50 U.S.C.A. § 650(b), (1951). It is similarly forbidden in Germany, 
GERMAN CoDE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 331 (para. 1) and § 358 (para. 2). So far as 
the author has been able to determine, the fact that defendants have nothing to lose 
by appealing under these circumstances has not proved unduly burdensome to tho courts. 
The practice of harsher resentencing is also forbidden in California and Virginia. People 
v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P .2d 677 (1963); Stonebreaker v. Smyth, 187 Vn. 250, 
70 F.2d 406 (1948). 
34. 329 F.2d 856,859 (3d Cir. 1964). 
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find relief.35 The soundness of this proposition is not based on the myth of 
"discovered" law - the fiction that a new standard of due process is really 
the standard that always existed but which earlier judges simply failed to sec.00 
It is based, rather, on the belief that the disabilities of imprisonment and 
the ignominy of a criminal conviction ought not depend upon the fortuity of 
- time 37 so long as the damage occasio11cd by the passage of time is tlot bcyo11d 
recall. The critical word in this proposition, of course, is "damage." Properly, 
it takes into account not only damage to the defendant but damage to society 
as well. Thus, there may be room for argument that retroactivity of overruling 
decisions should he stopped short of those cases where there currently exists 
no feasible opportunity for a successful reprosecution of the beneficiary of tlmt 
retroactive decision, at least where the unconstitutional taint did not affect the 
fairness of the original trial-cases such as Mapp v. Ohio. On the other hand, 
there seems little room for disagreement that society has no interest in cutting 
off postconviction remedies for those who could be effectively tried again ac-
cording to the most contemporary standard of due process. 
As previously noted, however, the practice of denying retroactive effect in-
directly by imposing a risk of harsher penalties has no rational connection 
with the one group of cases where retroactive effect might properly be denied 
- those cases in which the defendant is indubitably guilty but in which his 
guilt cannot be established in a second trial without crucial evidence which 
must be excluded only to deter certain pretrial police practices. In these 
cases ready access to postconviction remedies is unaffected by risk of a harsher 
penalty; the theoretical risk of a harsher sentence amounts to no risk at all 
because the prosecution will be unable to retry the defendant once it has been 
deprived of the crucial evidence. Knowing this to be so, the defendant vlill be 
undeterred from seeking to secure his unconditional release. Thus, the de-
terrent effect of the risk of harsher sentencing applies least to those for whom 
35. The most telling reason for collateral attack on judgments of conviction is that 
it operates to eliminate the risk of convicting the innocent. Such a risk attends any 
conviction ensuing from the witting use of perjured testimony, the suppression of 
evidence, an involuntary confession, the denial of an opportunity to present a de-
fense, and the denial of the right to counseL 
Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fiftl' States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 340-41. 
36. See 1 BLAcKSTONE, CoMMENTARIES 69 (1769); GRAY, THE NATURE AND SoURCES 
oF THE LAw 93 (2d ed. 1921); Levy, Realist lflrisprudetrce and Prospective Overruling, 
109 U. PA. L. REv.1 (1960). 
37. Of course, we are past the splendid myth of 'discovered law.' ••• 'Vc do not 
deal here, however, \vith considerations of res judicata and vested rights, but with 
the question whether, consonant \vith our society's conceptions of due process and 
general constitutional law, we could deny the constitutional right enunciated in 
Gideon to those who happened to be tried before the decision was handed d0\\11. 
Thus to hold would be to assign a lower constitutional status to pre-Gideon prisoners 
who were denied the right to counsel, a right so 'fundamental and essential to a 
fair trial' that it is made obligatory upon the States by the Fourteenth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution. • • • 
United States v. LaVallee, 330 F.2d 303, 312 (2d Cir. 1964). 
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it might be properly intended, and most to those for whom it is least justified. 
Finally, whatever the merit of any rule designed to limit the retroactive effect 
of an overruling constitutional decision, one would suppose that it must prop· 
erly be addressed to the Supreme Court. To the e.'dent that state practices are 
maintained deliberately to deny a retroactive effect which has already been ap· 
proved by the Court in a constitutional case, such practices are in conflict 
with the supremacy of the Court's law. 
It may be said, however, that the general rule which permits harsher sen .. 
tencing upon retrial and conviction needs no special defense, in that it simply 
recognizes that a different judge or jury may regard the offense or the offender 
more seriously. According to this view, the defendant ought not benefit from 
an original sentence which was - on hindsight - insufficiently severe; after 
all, there is certainly no reason to suppose that the first sentence was necessarily 
the only correct one. As a matter of fact, it is widely known that unduly lenient 
sentences may frequently be imposed following a plea of guilty, or following 
some bargain with the prosecutor.8S Even absent tell-tale signs such as these, 
surely many prisoners are serving light sentences simply from their undeserved 
good luck of having come before a soft-hearted or careless judge the first time 
around. Since the interests of society in exacting fair punishment or effective 
rehabilitation may not have been properly vindicated through the original 
sentence, it may be argued, the discretion of the second sentencing authority 
ought not be fettered by the rule proposed here. Least of all should such a 
rule obtain when the second trial was occasioned by the defendant's own 
successful petition for a new trial, followed by a trial and sentence which arc 
independent and free from error. 
The argument is plausible, but it must be rejected. It is doubtful in the first 
place whether the state's interest in this type of sentence revision is com~ 
pelling. For it is to be remembered that we are dealing with original convic· 
tions and sentences which are already free from legal error so far as tile state 
is concerned. If an original sentence were prejudicial to the state because it 
was more generous than that prescribed by statute, or because it was imposed 
by a judge who failed to consider evidence he was legally obliged to consider, 
the state can, under the federal Constitution, perfect its own appeal.!lO Grave 
38. See RUBIN, THE LAw oF CRIMINAL CoRRECTION 116-18 (1963) ; Ohlin and Rctn• 
ington, Sente11cing Structure: Its Effect Upon Systems for tile Admiuistratio11 of Crimi11al 
h1Stice, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PRoB. 495 (1958) ; Newman, Pleadiug Guilly for Cousidcra-
tioiiS: A Study of Bargai1~ htstice, 46 J. CRIM. L., C. & P.S. 780 (1956) ; Note, Guilty 
Plea Bargaining, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 865 (1963); Note, Prosecutor's Discrelioll, 103 U. 
PA. L. REv. 1057 (1955); Note, Tile lt1/ltte11ce of tile De/eudaut's Plea 011 Judicial Dt• 
termiuation of Sentmce, 66 YALE L.J. 204 (1956). 
39. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). Because of the decision in Kepner v. 
United States, 195 U.S.100 (1904), the federal government cannot appeal from nn erroneou~ 
acquittal and then retry the accused. Nevertheless, erroneous scutc11ces can be corrected 
without running afoul of the double jeopardy clause. See 28 U.S.C. § 2106 (19SS) ; 
CoNNECTICUT GoVERNoR's PRisoN STUDY CoMMI'ITEE, FIRST INTERIM REronT, App. (19S6); 
Note, Appellate Review of Sente11cing Procedure, 74 YALE L.J. 379 (1964). 
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errors in sentencing, as defined by a state's law enabling the state to appeal, 
are thus already guarded against to the e.-..act e.'\.i:ent the state legislature has 
has determined to be generally necessary to protect society. To the e.'\.i:ent that 
subliminal sentencing leniency, against which the legislature has not seen fit 
to protect society by establishing a sentence review board with wide latitude 
to revise sentences, may exist in practice, the state itself has indicated that 
protection against lenient sentences generally is not regarded as a compelling 
interest. 
Moreover, the availability of alternative means to protect the state against 
excessively lenient sentences, through establishment of a sentence review bo:~.rd 
to review and modify sentences generally,40 gives rise to a telling argument 
against approving an ad hoc resentencing practice which, in operation, specially 
discourages defendants from seeking to secure a fundamentally fair trial. This 
is a device available even to those states which have constitutional scruples 
against state appeal. As the Supreme Court has properly recognized, even 
laws or state practices which serve legitimate objectives may be unconstitu-
tional if they tend to abridge or discourage the e.xercise of constitutional rights, 
when alternative means are available which would equally fulfill those objec-
tives without the same adverse effect on constitutional rights. Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter expressed the imperative of choosing the least repressive feasible 
means of promoting social ends as follows: 
If the value to society of achieving the object ... is demonstrably out-
weighed by the impediment to which the regulation subjects those whose 
[constitutionally protected interests] are curtailed by it, or if the object 
sought by the regulation could with equal effect be achieved by alterna-
tive means which do not substantially impede those [interests], the regu-
lation cannot be sustained. 41 
Finally, doubt must frankly be e.xpressed that the policy reviewed in this 
argument does in fact account for the prevailing permissibility of harsher re-
sentencing. For if the states are really concerned that certain categories of 
sentences ought to be subject to revision in order more adequately to protect 
society, the current rule is a very strange way of e.'\.-pressing that concern. 
There is no evidence whatever to suggest that those able successfully to 
40. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937). For a discussion of the unusual pro-
cedure for sentence review in Connecticut, see Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960) ; CommCTI-
cUT GoVERNoR's PRisoN STUDY CoMMITTEE, FIRST INTERIM REPoRT (1956). So far as the 
author can determine, no state currently provides for an increase of a sentence ·within 
statutory limits unless the defendant makes the first move, and no state permits a trial 
judge to increase a sentence within statutory limits and not appealable by the state, once 
the trial court's term has e>..."Pired and service of the sentence has begun. 
41. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
See also McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Gt 283, 291 (1964). School Dist v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 265 (1963) (concurring opinion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-88 
(1960); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. :McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951); Hcil-
berg v. Fixa, 236 F. Supp. 405, 408 (N.D. CaL 1964), ccrt. granted, 33 U.S.L W.EEK 
3262 (1965). 
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appeal their original conviction or sentence are more likely than others to have 
been the beneficiaries of e.."'{cessively lenient sentences. Viewed as an expression 
of policy to correct unduly lenient sentences, more harshly sentencing only 
· those who are successful appellants appears to have no rational connection 
with the pattern, incidences, or causes of the whole group of sentences which 
may be objectionable. It appears far more likely, for instance, that those who 
plead guilty and who do not appeal (including the whole group of 11gttilty-plea 
bargainers"), are more frequently the beneficiaries of excessively lenient sen-
tences. Yet none of these, and no others e.."'{cept successful appellants, are cur-
rently subject to the risk of harsher resentencing. This is not to argue that the 
current practice of permitting harsher resentencing only of successful appellants 
necessarily violates the equal protection clause per se, though such an argument 
may well have merit, but merely to say that as a policy which ntust be forth· 
coming to justify the practical abridgment of the right to fair trial which 
results from permitting harsher sentencing of the unconstitutionally convicted, 
this policy is neither compelling nor does it have a substantial connection with 
the condition of implied waiver which it seeks to justify. 
Finally, however, it may be contended that the concern for those convicts 
held under unconstitutional convictions is a tempest in a teapot. For only 
those who are successfully retried run any risk of a harsher sentence or, for 
that matter, any sentence at all. Innocent convicts, serving time under defective 
judgments, will be undeterred from seeking post-conviction relief by any risk 
of being convicted - much less sentenced - a second time; secure in their 
knowledge of their own innocence, and justifiably confident that any new, fair 
trial will exonerate them, they have nothing to fear from the power of courts 
to deal more sharply with their guilty cellmates. Surely, it is not too much to 
discourage these latter from congesting the courts with motions for new trials, 
appeals, or habeas petitions, by reminding them that they ought to be content 
with whatever leniency has been shown them through the original sentence. 
The second verdict, delivered after a circumspect trial, demonstrates that the 
guilty defendant was trifling with the state and wasting its resources in seeking 
a new trial in the first place. A rule of practice, therefore, which merely com-
mits independent sentencing discretion to the second tribunal is laudable, for 
it inhibits only those who are guilty, and who know that they would be con-
victed again, from wasting and abusing post-conviction remedies which ought 
not to be regarded as playthings of jailhouse lawyers. 
This argument is easily penetrated. A second trial, consistent with pro-
cedural regularity, is not an ironclad guarantee of acquittal for the innocent. 
The studies by Borchard 42 and Frank,43 among others, provide vivid illus-
trations of regular trials reaching erroneous conclusions. Consequently, no 
sensible person in or out of prison should be inclined to confuse his personal 
certitude of his own innocence of a given offense with a misbegotten confidence 
42. BoRCHARD, CoNVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932). 
43. FRANK, NOT GUILTY (1957). 
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that a jury cannot be persuaded othenvise, even beyond a reasonable and 
irreversible doubt. In fact, the innocent convict was already once misjudged 
by a jury of his peers, and the constitutional defect present in that trial may 
not have been a contributing factor. Constitutionally correct procedure is the 
nearest approximation to omniscient decision-making which society's sense of 
fundamental decency, economy, and capacity currently affords. It would claim 
too much, however, to insist that it never errs. Innocent persons therefore 
may be persuaded to forego an opportunity for a fair trial, under the current 
permissibility of harsher sentences, from a justifiable apprehension that they 
will be convicted again. 
Further, among "innocent" convicts who must gauge the likelihood of being 
convicted, the pressure to relinquish post-conviction remedies will be strongest, 
of course, for those who have already served substantial time under sentences 
open to collateral attack, and for whom even a small risk of being convicted 
again - with its concomitant risk of a substantial increase in the sentence, 
and the loss of credit for time previously served and of good conduct points -
would appear unreasonable. There is no reason to suppose, however, that 
there are more guilty convicts within this group than among the categories 
of convicts having less, little, or nothing to lose by seeking a new trial. 
Finally, aside from the falsity of the premise that only the guilty need fear 
conviction, and the unequal fashion in which harsher resentencing carries it 
out, it is important to reiterate that procedural due process is simply not based 
only on a concern to determine guilt or innocence. As a matter of fact, signifi-
cant extensions of procedural due process have commonly been made in cases 
where the "guilty accused" were unconditionally released. Constitutional im-
munity from coerced confessions, unreasonable searches and seizures, self-
incriminating disclosures, multiple and harassing prosecutions, and cruel and 
unusual punishments are not constitutionally forbidden solely because they 
might convict the innocent. Immunity from such practices is required, rather, 
because of considerations of decency which transcend the statutory guilt of 
any particular person. To confine the availability of constitutional appeal to 
those who are certain that they would be acquitted in a second trial, and to 
those who, while equally certain of their actual guilt, have no fear of being 
tried a second time is to ignore the basis of such constitutional standards. 
Of the arguments which might support the prevailing practice, then, none 
seems sufficient to ex-cuse the adverse effect on the rights of the unconstitu-
tionally convicted which the practice currently produces. And for that reason, 
it is submitted that waiver of the benefits of an original sentence of the un-
constitutionally convicted may well be a prohibited condition which unreason-
ably abridges fifth and fourteenth amendment rights to a fundamentally fair 
trial. 
BEYOND THE UNcoNSTITUTIONALLY CoNVICTED 
The argument from unconstitutional conditions applies only to those held 
in state and federal prisons under a conviction suffering from a federal con-
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stitutional defect. The greater number of prisoners deterred from pursuing 
post-conviction remedies, however, are held under convictions which are sub~ 
ject to attack only on non-constitutional grounds: misrulings on hearsay evi~ 
dence, erroneous instructions, or other mistakes sufficient for reversal accord~ 
ing to state or federal law but not sufficient to affect that fundamental fairness 
implicit in procedural due process. These cases cannot readily be brought 
within the doctrine of unconstitutional condition, since relinquishment of the 
benefit of a prior sentence is not made a condition for the enjoyment of a 
constitutional right. Nevertheless, because the states have "no interest in pre .. 
serving erroneous judgments," and "no interest in foreclosing appeals there .. 
from by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to appea1,"44 these de .. 
fendants should also be freed of the risk of more severe sentencing upon retrial 
for the same offense. Hopefully the states will remedy the situation of their own 
accord by appropriate legislative or judicial action.4G Beyond this, a failure of 
local responsibility in this field might arguably move the Supreme Court to 
take corrective action of its own through appropriate application of the double 
jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, e.'{tended to the states via the due 
process clause of the fourteenth amendment. A double jeopardy argument 
has been repeatedly tried and denied in the federal courts in one aspect, but 
the argument may still have considerable promise in a new and different aspect. 
Historically, the approach has been one of emphasizing that at common 
law, a trial placing an accused in jeopardy once was all that the state could 
justly insist upon in the enforcement of its criminal statutes. Whether the 
trial resulted in a conviction or an acquittal, the defendant was equally to be 
protected against any subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The pri .. 
mary purpose was allegedly to spare an accused from the ordeal of repeated 
prosecutions,46 and not merely to protect him from multiple punishments.41 It 
44. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 497, 386 P.2d 677, 686 (1963). 
45. See Agata, Time Served Under a Reversed Sente11ce or C01wictio11 - A Proposal 
and a Basis for Decision, 25 MoNT. L. REv. 3 (1963) ; Whalen, s11Pra note 32. 
46. The prohibition [of the fifth amendment] is not against being twice punished, but 
against being twice put in jeopardy; and the accused, whether convicted or acquitted, 
is equally put in jeopardy at the first trial. 
United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 669 (1896); see also discussion in Downum v. United 
States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963) ; Green v. United States 355 U.S. 184, 187, 200, 203 (1957) l 
E~ parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163, 169 (1873). • 
47. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121, 159-60 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) : Abbate 
v. United States, 359 U.S. 187, 201 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) ; United States v. Ben~, 
282 U.S. 304, 307 (1931); E~ parte Lange, s11[Jra note 46; United States v. Roscnstre!cb, 
204 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1953). 
Dicta in E~ parte Lange, sttpra note 46, and United States v. Benz, supra, have misled 
some federal district courts into believing that they could not correct a sentence which 
was more generous than that allowed by statute. See, e.g., Buhler v. Hill, 7 F. Supp. 857 
(M.D. Pa. 1934). This is incorrect, i.e., the Lange case compels no such result. See Cow~ 
NECTICUT GoVERNoR's PRisoN STUDY CoMMI!TEE, FmsT INTERIM REPORT, App. 4 (1956). 
The La11ge case is good authority, however, that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth 
amendment protects against multiple punishment for the same offense by the same sovereign, 
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would appear to follow that one who has been convicted, and who successfully 
appeals that conviction, cannot be tried again for the same offense. Any second 
trial would necessarily nvice place him in jeopardy and would seemingly violate 
an absolute constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. 
Were the double jeopardy clause to have been interpreted in this absolute 
fashion there would be no need to concern ourselves 'vith a limited objection 
directed only to harsher resente11ci11g after a second prosecution. An orthodox 
double jeopardy claim holds that a successful appellant must be unconditionally 
released, i.e., that he cannot be retried (or resentenced) at all. And this, of 
course, is precisely what federal criminal appellants have repeatedly argued -
that the double jeopardy clause of the fifth amendment, in conformity with 
the English practice (prior to 1964) ,48 bars any subsequent prosecution or 
punishment for the same offense. 
The practical reasons which account for the failure of this absolute view 
are not difficult to divine. Notwithstanding the unqualified language of the 
double jeopardy clause there is no interest of the criminally accused sufficient 
to warrant his unconditional release following successful appeal solely because 
- there was some error committed in the first trial, at least absent a showing that 
the error was of such a kind that reprosecution would amount to unreasonable 
harassment. Conversely, there is a substantial societal interest closely related 
to an opportunity for retrial ; the protection of society may fairly require that 
those who are guilty of grave offenses must not be insulated from the criminal 
process because of just any mis-step committed in their original trial. The 
purpose of double jeopardy protection is thus not one of providing absolute 
immunity from reprosecution per se, but from unreasonable reprosecution.4D 
Another practical reason for our disinclination to follow the English rule ro 
and that it is not merely protection against multiple and harassing trials as suggested in 
later dicta, note 46 supra. See United States v. Ball, supra note 46. 
48. See notes 50, 52 i11jra. 
49. United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463 (1964), drawing the line after Downum , •• 
United States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), is a clear and contemporary affirmation of the principle 
at the federal level. Palko v. Connecticut 302 U.S. 319 (1937), refusing to apply the rule 
of Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904), acknowledges an even greater deference 
to the states which have the primary responsibility in criminal law enforcement. For 
other indications that only "unreasonable" reprosecution is condemned by the double jeo-
pardy clause, see Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 189 (1957) ; Wade v. Hunter, 336 
U.S. 684 (1949) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1896) ; Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 
430 (1887) ; Hopt v. Utah, 114 U.S. 488 (1885) ; Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) ; 
Hoptv. People, 104 U.S. 631 (1881). 
50. Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, 7 Edw. 7, c. 23, § 4(1)-(2); Regina v. Connelly, 3 
WEEKLY L.R 839, 847 (Crim. App. 1963) (dictum). See also ARCRiloLD, Cnn.m<AL PLEAD-
ING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE§§ 861, 912 (35th ed. 1962) j PALMER & PAU.mR, HAnms's 
CRIMINAL LAw 505 (20th ed. 1960). 
The English practice has not been entirely more favorable to defendants than has the 
American practice. For instance, errors not resulting in a "miscarriage of justice" will 
result in dismissal of the appeal in England, while certain constitutional errors (e.g., denial 
of appointed counsel) result in reversal in America, regardless of the lack of demonstrated 
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may be that appellate courts might not so generously overturn criminal con~ 
victions if the double jeopardy clause required them to order the unconditional 
release of the successful appellant and forbade them to remand for a new 
trial.51 Thus, the permissibility of a new trial and conviction may be of benefit 
to appellants as well as to the govemment.'12 
In rejecting an aU-or-nothing double jeopardy argument, however, the 
Supreme Court has not always employed a straightforward analysis. To 
avoid the unqualified language of the double jeopardy clause which appears 
flatly to prohibit placing the accused in jeopardy more than once, the Court 
has had recourse to a tangled variety of legal fictions, making the clause an 
extraordinary technical jungle. The Court has, for instance, declined to hold 
simply that the double jeopardy clause does not always forbid subjecting an 
accused to more than one trial, as when he successfully appeals his original 
prejudice. The English Court of Criminal Appeal may dismiss an appeal under section five 
of the Criminal Appeal Act of 1907, if the record supports a conviction on some other 
ground in the indictment, without remission of sentence for the erroneous conviction, 
Regina v. Lovelock, 1 WEEKLY L.R. 1217, 40 Cr. App. R. 137 (1956). Section Three of 
the Criminal Appeal Act also authorizes the Court of Criminal Appeal to "pass such other 
sentence warranted in law by the verdict (whether more or less severe) in substitution 
therefor as they think ought to have been passed • • • ." 
51. From the standpoint of a defendant, it is at least doubtful that appellate courts 
would be as zealous as they now are in protecting against the effects oi improprieties 
at the trial or pretrial stage if they knew that reversal of a conviction would put 
the accused irrevocably beyond the reach of further prosecution. In reality, therefore, 
the practice of retrial serves defendants' rights as well as society's interest. 
United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 463, 466 (1964). 
52. 'Whether or not its reasons are equally persuasive to all, the Supreme Court has 
consistently maintained that a successful appeal need not require the unconditional release 
of the appellant, unless reprosecution would otherwise involve unreasonable harassment: 
[I]f a defendant appeals his conviction and obtains a reversal, all agree, certainly 
in this country, that he may be retried for the same offense. The reason is, obviously, 
not that the defendant has consented to the second trial - he would much prefer 
that the conviction be set aside and no further proceedings had - but that tho 
continuation of the proceedings by an appeal, together with the reversal of the con• 
viction, are sufficient to permit a re-examination of the issue of the defendant's 
guilt without doing violence to the purposes behind the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 219 (1957) (dissenting opinion), 
Set! also United States v. Tateo, supra note 51; Forman v. United States, 361 U.S. 416 
(1960) ; Bryan v. United States, 338 U.S. 552 (1950) ; Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 
15 (1919) ; United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 671-72 (1896) ; United States v. Sanges, 
144 u.s. 310 (1892). 
Critics who may be impressed by the different practice which obtained in England 
until 1964 should bear in mind the countervailing disadvantages which were equally n 
feature of that practice. Sec discussion in note SO sttPra. Moreover, the Criminal Appeal 
Act of 1964 now authorizes a new trial under certain circumstances although, significantly, 
"upon reconviction the accused may not be given a sentence of greater severity than that 
imposed at the original trial, and the new sentence is dated back to the commencement oi 
the former sentence, excluding any time spent on bail meanwhile." Samuels, Crimiual Appeal 
Act, 1964, 27 MoDERN L. REv. 568, 572 (1964). 
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conviction. Rather, it has written as though it assumed that reprosecution is 
generally forbidden but that reprosecution somehow is not forbidden in this 
class of cases because: 
In prosecuting his former writ of error plaintiff in error voluntarily ac-
cepted the result, and it is well settled that a convicted person cannot by 
his own act avoid the jeopardy in which he stands, and then assert it as 
a bar to subsequent jeopardy.63 
* * * 
The accused by his own action has obtained a reversal of the whole judg-
ment, and we see no reason why he should not, upon a new trial, be 
proceeded against as if no trial had previously taken place. We do not 
agree to the view that the accused has the right to limit his waiver as to 
jeopardy, when he appeals from a judgment against him. As the judgment 
stands before the appeals, it is a complete bar to any further prosecution 
for the offense set forth in the indictment, or of any lesser degree thereof. 
No power can wrest from him the right to so use that judgment, but if 
he chooses to appeal from it and to ask for its reversal he thereby waives, 
if successful, his right to avail himself of the former acquittal of the greater 
offense, contained in the judgment which he has himself procured to be 
reversed. 54 
Even though this waiver theory was probably adopted (and can only be 
justified) to avoid e%cessive protection which might othenvise flow from the 
double jeopardy clause, it is basically unsatisfactory in theory because regard-
less of whether the second trial is occasioned by the defendant's appeal or by 
the government's appeal, the defendant is placed in jeopardy a second time 
and subjected to the ordeal of a second trial. If one takes the point of view 
that the double jeopardy clause is an absolute prohibition against multiple 
prosecutions per se, rather than a general restriction operative against m:-
reasonable reprosecution - when, for example, the government muffed a 
fair chance to secure a conviction, or when it seeks to wear down the defendant 
by repeated prosecution - then there can be no waiver by the defendant. To 
say that he can waive protection, or to insist that he must so waive as a con-
dition for appealing his conviction, is either to deny that the protection is ab-
solute or to maintain that one can be required to forfeit a constitutional right 
to absolute protection as a condition for securing the privilege of appeal. The 
latter proposition classically describes an unconstitutional condition. Mr. Justice 
Holmes made the point very well when he observed: 
In a capital case ... a man cannot waive, and certainly vlill not be taken 
to waive without meaning it, fundamental constitutional rights .•.• Usu-
ally no such waiver is expressed or thought of. Moreover, it cannot be 
imagined that the law would deny to a prisoner the correction of a fatal 
53. Murphy v. Massachusetts, 177 U.S. 155, 158 (1900). 
54. Trona v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 533 (1905). See also Stroud v. United 
States, 251 U.S. 15, 18 (1919), rehearing denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920); United States v. 
Ball, 163 U.S. 662, 672 (1896); Robinson v. United States, 144 F.2d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 
1944), affd, 324 U.S. 282 (1945). 
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error, unless he should waive other rights so important as to be saved 
by an e."<press clause in the Constitution of the United States.tHl 
The waiver theory, moreover, is unsatisfactory in fact because it infers a 
voluntary, freely made decision to relinquish a purportedly absolute constitu-
tional right even when it is perfectly clear that the defendant was not e.'Cer· 
cising a free and uncoerced choice. The "waiver" inferred in Tro11o v. Uttitcd 
States, where the defendant was deemed to waive double jeopardy protection 
against reprosecution for one offense of which he was not convicted, when he 
appealed his conviction of a lesser offense, drew the following dissent from 
Mr. Justice McKenna: 
I repeat again, that constitutional guarantees and statutory remedies should 
not be put in such barter; that a defendant should not be required to give 
up the protection of a just ... acquittal of one crime as the price of ob· 
taining a review of an unjust conviction of another crime,tio 
Further, the standard of waiver in the double jeopardy cases is wholly 
unreconcilable with the test of free and uncoerced consent which the Supreme 
Court has since required in analogous situations. A leading illustration is 
Fay v. Noia.rn Charles Noia and two companions were indicted, tried and 
convicted for felony murder in New York in 1942. Of the three men, only 
Noia was not sentenced to death. Because of his dread that he might be con· 
victed again and then sentenced to death, and on the advice of competent 
counsel, Noia did not appeal his conviction. His companions- who had noth· 
ing to lose - successfully attacked their conviction on due process ground 
that confessions admitted at the trial had been coerced. Both men were un· 
conditionally released in 1955; without the tainted confessions, the state was 
unable successfully to prosecute them again. Understandably, these develop-
ments influenced Noia to reconsider his original decision not to appeal. Rebuffed 
in the state courts, he filed a petition for habeas corpus in the federal district 
court. That court's denial was reversed on appeal, and the reversal was 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. On the critical issues -whether Noia waived 
the alleged constitutional defect by his failure to pursue available state remedies 
in a timely fashion, and whether his failure to appeal othenvise constituted 
an independent and adequate state grounds rendering federal habeas ttnavail· 
able as a matter of statutory law or judicial discretion - the Court held for 
Noia because: 
For Noia to have appealed in 1942 would have been to run a substantial 
risk of electrocution. His was the grisly choice whether to sit content with 
life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, i£ 
successful, might well have led to a retrial and death sentence. See, e.g., 
Palko v. Connecticut . . . He declined to play Russian roulette in this 
fashion. This was a choice by Noia not to appeal, but under the circum· 
55. Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S.100, 135 (1904). 
56. 199 U.S. at 539 (1905). 
57. 372 u.s. 391 (1963). 
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stances it cannot realistically be deemed a merely tactical or strategic 
litigation step, or in any ·way a deliberate circumvention of state pro-
cedures.58 
Nevertheless, even cases like Fay v. Noiar;9 ought not be read as suggesting 
that the Court should now resolve the deterrent effect of the risk of harsher 
sentencing upon one's right to appeal by flatly prohibiting all reprosecutions 
on an absolute reading of the double jeopardy clause. Indeed, the double jeo-
pardy cases are better understood as striking a balance between societal needs 
of self-protection and the individual's right to be protected from flnrcasonablc 
reprosecution and multiple punishments. They need not be regarded as doc-
trinally so foolish as to hold that reprosecution is absolutely forbidden, but 
that a defendant can be compelled to surrender that protection as a condition 
of appealing his conviction. 
For these reasons, the double jeopardy clause would not appear to represent 
much of a prospect for protecting successful criminal appellants from the 
harsher sentence which may follow a second trial. In 1957, however, the Su-
preme Court decided Green v. United States,CAJ which substantially incorpo-
rated into the double jeopardy clause a concern for protecting the right of 
appeal. This case lends itself to a direct attack upon the permissibility of 
harsher resentencing after a second trial for the same offense. 
Green had been indicted and tried in the District of Columbia for arson 
and felony murder, the latter charge arising from the death of an occupant 
of the premises which were burned. The trial judge charged the jury that they 
could find Green guilty of arson and first degree murder or of second degree 
murder. The second degree murder charge was in error, since the indictment 
and the government's case for homicide depended entirely upon tl1e felony 
murder statute which authorized only a verdict of first degree murder. The 
jury returned a verdict of guilty of arson and of second degree murder. Green 
was sentenced from one to three years for arson, and from five to twenty 
years for second degree murder. He successfully appealed his conviction for 
second degree murder, following which he was again tried and convicted 
under the original indictment for first degree murder and sentenced to death. 
This time, he carried an appeal to the Supreme Court, contending that the 
second trial for first degree murder violated the double jeopardy clause of 
the fifth amendment. Technically, his argument was that he had been impliedly 
acquitted of first degree murder at his first trial, he had not appealed from 
that acquittal, and his appeal from the conviction of second degree murder 
could not be regarded as a waiver of the double jeopardy protection arising 
from his acquittal of first degree murder provided. At most, his appeal from 
the second degree murder conviction would enable the government to prose-
58. Id. at 439-40. 
59. See also United States ex rel. Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71 (5th Cir.), ccrl. 
denied,361 U.S. 850 (1959). 
60. 355 U.S.184 (1957). 
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cute him again for that offense.61 A majority of the Supreme Court accepted 
Green's argument, specifically holding only that an appeal from a conviction 
for a lesser included offense does not waive protection from reprosecution for 
a greater offense of which the defendant was impliedly acquitted. 
On its face, Green v. United States appears to be an orthodox double jeopardy 
case which merely carries out a traditional double jeopardy policy of restricting 
the government to a single error-free trial for a given offense, followed by an 
acquittal. Viewed this way, the case would appear to have little utility for 
our consideration of harsher resentencing at the end of a second trial occasioned 
by a successful appeal from an erroneous conviction for the same offense. The 
traditional rationale of Stroud v. United States 62 - that the defendant waives 
whatever benefit he got from a conviction by appealing that conviction on non· 
constitutional grounds - is still intact. · 
Nevertheless, the Green case permits a different view - that the Court 
employed the double jeopardy clause principally as a means of protecting 
Green's statutory right to appeal rather than his constitutional right to be safe 
from repeated prosecution. While the majority employed a double jeopardy 
technique to reach its result, its opinion principally bears down on the effect 
of the risk of reprosecution in deterring access to postconviction remedies, and 
not on the alleged ordeal which a second trial might portend. Thus, explaining 
why it would not infer any waiver by Green in appealing his second degree 
conviction, the Court said : 
Reduced to plain terms, the Government contends that in order to 
secure a reversal of an erroneous conviction of one offense, a defendant 
must surrender his valid defense of former jeopardy not only on that 
offense but also on a different offense for which he was not convicted 
and which was not involved in his appeal. Or stated in the terms of this 
case, he must be willing to barter his constitutional protection a~ainst a 
second prosecution for an offense punishable by death as the prtce of n 
successful appeal from an erroneous conviction of another offense for 
which he had been sentenced to five to twenty years' imprisonment. As 
the Court of Appeals said in its first opinion in this case, a defendant 
faced with such a "choice" takes a "desperate chance" in securing the 
reversal of the erroneous conviction. The law should not, and in our 
judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible dilcmma,03 
In his dissent in Green, Mr. Justice Frankfurter recognized that the majority's 
use of the double jeopardy clause was based on its concern with unfettered 
access to postconviction remedies, rather than on a concern to protect Green 
from any further prosecution, and he noted that that concern would apply 
equally to cases (such as Stroud) where an appeal might be taken from a C01l• 
61. In fact, however, the government's case for murder could not be proved other 
than through the felony murder statute, and Green had no reason to fear a second prosecu· 
tion for second degree murder. True enough, Green was not prosecuted again. 
62. 251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920). 
63. 355 U.S. at 193-94. 
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viction of the same offense for which the original sentence was less than the 
maximum.64 
Furthermore, the double jeopardy technique of Green critically depended 
upon the accuracy of the majority's assumption that Green had been acquitted 
of first degree murder, following a trial in which the government had a fair 
opportunity to secure a conviction and a sentence adequately protecting so-
ciety's interest. 65 As a number of commentators have pointed out, however, 
this assumption was not necessarily accurate.ll6 It was equally consistent with 
the facts that the jury was motivated by sympathy for the accused and pre-
ferred to find him guilty of second degree murder to avoid subjecting him to 
the mandatory death penalty, though they honestly believed him guilty of first 
degree murder. Under this hypothesis, Green actually profited from the judge's 
erroneous instructions, and the government was deprived of a fair trial ; for 
had the jury been given the option of acquitting or convicting only of first 
degree murder (without the alternative of second degree murder) it might 
well have convicted. Equally consistent with the facts is the possibility that 
the jury divided among themselves between first and second degree murder, 
or even acquittal, and simply compromised their differences. Under either 
view, the error of the trial court was to the prejudice of the government, 
rather than of the defendant, and but for the disputable decision in Kepner v. 
United States,61 the government would have been able to appeal with every 
right to continue the case - to retry Green with the prospect of having him 
sentenced to death. Green should have gone the other way, in this view, if 
only to limit the basically unsound effect of Keptzcr.68 
64. Of special relevance is Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15, 17-18. In that CISe 
the defendant was indicted for murder, and the jury returned a verdict of "guilty 
as charged in the indictment without capital punishment." The judgment \vas re-
versed and a new trial had on which the defendant was again found guilty of murder, 
but without a reco=endation against capital punishment. He \V3S then sentenced 
to death. This Court expressly relied on Tro11o in affirming the judgment and re-
jecting the contention that the imposition of a greater punishment had placed the 
defendant twice in jeopardy. As a practical matter, and on any hlsis of human 
values, it is scarcely possible to distinguish a case in which the defendant is con-
victed of a greater offense from one in which he was previously convicted but carries 
a significantly different punishment, namely death rather than imprisonment. 
Whatever formal disclaimers may be made, neither Tro11o nor the reliance placed 
upon it for more than half a century permits any other conclusion than that the 
Court today overrules that decision. 
355 U.S. at 213 (dissenting opinion). 
65. Stroud v. United States was e.'Cpressly distinguished by the majority on this hlsis. 
I d. at 195 n.14. 
66. See, e.g., Note, 56 MicH. L. REv. 1192 (1958) ; Note, 6 U.C.LA. L R£v. 321, 
322-23 (1959). 
67. 195 U.S. 100 (1904) (holding that the double jeopardy clause forbids the federal 
government from appealing from an acquittal and from retrying the accused). 
68. As :Mr. Justice Cardozo remarked: "[T]he dissenting opinions [in Kepner] show 
how much was to be said in favor of a different ruling." Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 
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It is further arguable that Green benefited in still another way from the trial 
court's error. The jury, it will be recalled, convicted Green of arson as well 
as of second degree murder. The judge sentenced Green from one to three 
years for arson, even though the arson statute authorized imprisonment up 
to ten years. The sentence appears to be comparatively lenient, considering that 
Green's arson resulted in the death of an innocent occupant of the fired prCJnises. 
And it may have been lenient solely because the judge felt free to reserve a more 
appropriately severe sentence for the second degree murder count, a sentence 
of from five to twenty years. Had the judge not had that additional ground for 
more severely sentencing Green, he might well have imposed a harsher sentence 
on the arson count. The results of the trial court's error may therefore have 
been to secure Green an implied acquittal of first degree murder which he 
would not otherwise have had, and to secure him a lighter sentence for arson 
than he otherwise deserved. And yet, the judge's oversight was not due to 
any fault of the government. 
As an orthodox double jeopardy case, the decision is therefore objectionable 
because the majority's reliance on "implied acquittal" may have been mistaken 
and because the Court's e..'<pansive reading of the double jeopardy clause un~ 
reasonably subordinated societal interests in punishing the guilty to excessive 
protection of an accused from a second trial. On the other hand, the case is 
much more tractable if it is viewed in terms of the Court's additional concern 
more adequately to protect access to post-conviction remedies, and not merely 
to protect the accused from reprosecution per se. While there may be a com .. 
pelting public interest in reprosecution, there is probably no substantial public 
interest served by a broad rule of waiver which operates to foreclose legis .. 
latively prescribed rights for testing the legality (and even the constitutionality) 
of convictions which may have been unfairly obtained. 
It may still appear to be a difficult task to force the more ordinary harsher 
resentencing case into the double jeopardy clause, even assuming that the 
clause does offer (since Green) some protection from threats to significant 
statutory rights of appeal. The difficulties are these: first, relief under the 
double jeopardy clause generally bars any reprosecution and not merely any 
harsher sentence. In doing so, it goes too far; i.e., it releases the guilty eveu 
when reprosecution would not be an act of harassment, and even though pro .. 
tection from harsher resentencing alone would be sufficient to protect the 
right of appeal. Second, successful use of the double jeopardy argument, even 
after Green, depends upon the fiction of implied acquittal. In the typical case 
where the defendant is retried (and sentenced more harshly) for the same 
offense of which he was convicted, it may be difficult to imagine such an im~ 
plied acquittal. 
319, 323 (1937). The fact that Green could be tried again, albeit only for second degree 
rather than first degree murder, tends to undercut the double jeopardy rationale o£ the 
majority which was grounded in a policy barring repeated prosecution. 
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Nevertheless, both of these difficulties can be overcome, and, in fact, were 
overcome in the case of People v. Henderson/m recently decided by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court. 70 In the Henderson case, defendant bad pleaded guilty 
to first degree murder and had been sentenced to life imprisonment. On de-
fendant's appeal, the district court of appeal reversed the judgment and re-
manded for new trial. As a result of the second trial for the same offense, de-
fendant again was convicted and the jury fixed the penalty at death. On auto-
matic appeal to the California Supreme Court, the conviction was again re-
versed due to the trial judge's error in failing on his own motion to instruct 
the jury on the legal significance of the evidence of defendant's alleged mentm 
illness. The question then arose whether defendant could be sentenced to 
death in the event that he was convicted again. Off-hand, even noting that 
the California double jeopardy provision had been interpreted in line with 
the Green case, a negative answer would appear self evident: 
a. Defendant had been twice co1zvicted before of the same degree of the 
same offense. It was manifestly impossible therefore, to infer an "implied 
acquittal" as in Green. 
b. The original, more lenient sentence was secured on a plea of guilty, 
while the sentence of death was imposed by a jury after a complete and 
independent e.'q)osure to the whole case. Not only was it likely that the 
harsher sentence was as warranted as the earlier, more lenient, one, but 
it was entirely likely that the first sentence may have been unreasonably 
influenced by the guilty plea, or that the judge failed to canvass all aspects 
of the case properly bearing on sentencing. 
c. The error in the first trial from which defendant sought relief, while 
serious enough to prejudice him under California law, was not of such 
enormous importance to fundamental fair play that deterrence of defend-
ant's appeal represented by the risk of a harsher sentence upon retrial 
would itself represent great hardship, i.e., it 'vas not a question of due 
process. 
d. State and federal decisions other than Green would have allowed harsher 
sentencing on a principle of waiver.71 
Nevertheless, by forthrightly construing the California double jeopardy analogue 
of the fifth amendment in keeping with the policy demand of Green to protect 
postconviction remedies, Mr. Justice Traynor held that the original life sen-
tence would automatically bar a more severe sentence upon retrial and con-
viction: 
Since the Green and Gomez cases have now established that a reversed 
conviction of a lesser degree of a crime precludes convictions of a higher 
degree on retrial, the rationale of the Stroud and Grill cases has been 
vitiated. It is immaterial to the basic purpose of the constitutional pro-
69. 60 Ca12d 482, 386 p .2d 677 (1963). 
70. Recently appointed Chief Justice. 
71. E.g., People v. Grill, 151 CaL 592, 91 Pac. 515 (1907) ; Stroud v. United Stat;!s, 
251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing de11ied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920); Murphy v. Mass:tcl!Usetts, 177 
U.S. 155 (1900). See notes 14 and 15 supra. 
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vision against double jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime 
into different degrees carrying different punishments or allows the court 
·or jury to fi.."< different punishments for the same crime. 
* * * A defendant's right to appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably 
impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that right. Since 
the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no 
interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable con~ 
ditions on the right to appeal.72 
The Henderson case was, to be sure, decided exclusively on the basis of a 
state constitutional double jeopardy provision and not on the basis of the four~ 
teenth amendment. The necessity for forcing the case into a state constitution 
double jeopardy rationale, rather than treating it as an illustration of a federal 
unconstitutional condition, under our earlier discussion, is not difficult to e~ 
plain. Henderson's appeal was not based on a claim that he had been denied 
a fourteenth amendment right. The trial judge's error was error only according 
to California law; it was not sufficiently fundamental to run afoul of the 
fourteenth amendment. Because no federal constitutional right to due process 
would have been abridged by the risk of harsher punishment upon retrial, 
Justice Traynor may have thought it necessary to find some other means of 
reaching the desired result. Given the United States Supreme Court's example 
of forcing such a result under the double jeopardy clause in GrectJ) and the 
nearly identical wording of the California double jeopardy provision,13 it was 
perfectly reasonable for Mr. Justice Traynor to proceed as he did. The fact 
that a double jeopardy rationale was employed, however, should not obscure 
the point that the result was actually dictated by the effect of the risk of more 
severe punishment upon the adequacy of defendant's postconviction remedy: 
The fact remains that, in certain cases, a defendant who has good ground 
for appeal will be dissuaded from appeal because of the possibility of 
receiving a greater sentence, especially if that greater sentence is the 
ultimate punishment. 
* * * In view of these considerations, the problem may be approached not as in~ 
volving the e."<:tent of double jeopardy, but rather the extent of the limita~ 
tions that can be placed on the right to appeal. This analysis makes it 
apparent that the practical effect of allowing a greater sentence to be im~ 
posed on retrial is exactly the same as the effect of allowing a cotwiction 
for a greater crime on retria1.14 
With the benefit of Green v. U'nited States and People v. H cmlcrsotl_, there 
is support emerging in favor of a broad double jeopardy rule which would 
protect all federal and state convicts held in prison under erroneous convictions 
72. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 497, 386 P.2d 677, 686 (1963), 
73. "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense." Calif. Const. 
art I § 13. "[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in 
jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. CoNST. amend. V. 
74. Note, 50 VA. L. REv. 559, 564 (1964). But see Note, 13 KAN. L. REv. 155 (1964), 
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or sentences from harsher resentencing following retrial. Employing the analy-
sis implicit in the California court's treatment of the Henderson case, the tech-
nical argument applying that rule would be as follows: \Vhen a particular 
penalty is selected from a range of penalties prescribed for a given offense, 
and when that penalty is imposed upon the defendant, the judge or jury is 
impliedly "acquitting'' the defendant of a greater penalty, just as the jury 
in Green impliedly acquitted him of a higher offense and just as other juries 
have impliedly acquitted the accused of a greater degree of the same offense. 
Thus, the range of penalties applicable to a given offense would be treated 
for double jeopardy purposes just the same as the range of degrees for a given 
offense. Failure to impose a higher penalty, like a failure to find guilt of a 
higher degree, would amount to an acquittal of that degree of punishment. 
At that point, double jeopardy protection from retrial for the same offense 
(or for the same degree of punishment) of which one has previously been 
acquitted would take hold : the defendant could still be retried and punished 
for the offense and up to the degree of punishmetzt of which he was originally 
convicted, of course, because he "waived" his double jeopardy protection by 
appealing his conviction. He could not be retried for a greater offense or a 
greater punishment, however, for he obviously had not appealed from his im-
plied acquittal of such offense or punishment and consequently cannot be said 
to have waived the protection provided by that acquittal.711 
To complete this double jeopardy argument, the Supreme Court would 
have to be persuaded to impose the fifth amendment's double jeopardy clause 
on the states, through the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, a 
fact of incorporation not yet accomplished. Such incorporation, however, is not 
unlikely in view of Mr. Justice Frankfurter's retirement, the Court's trend 
increasingly to absorb the first eight amendments into the fourteenth in all 
their fullness,76 and the announced position of at least two members of the 
75. It has doubtless been noted that the principal supporting cases for this argument 
(Green, Henderson, and to a lesser e.'\.-tent Noia) involved the risk of death as the possible 
punishment following reprosecution. It appears most unlikely, however, that the Supreme 
Court would limit either a double jeopardy or an "unconstitutional condition" hm on 
harsher resentencing only to capital cases. The distinction between capital and noncapital 
offenses for determining the scope of a constitutional right has faded. Sec Gideon y. 
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) ; Kinsella v. United States ex rei. Singleton, 361 U.S. 
234 (1960). The dissent in He11derson assumed that the majority's double jeopardy rule 
would apply equally to noncapital cases. People v. Henderson, 60 Cal. 2d 482, 505, 3S6 
p 2d 677, 691 (1963). 
76. For recent illustrations, see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) ; Escobedo v. 
Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) ; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) ; Gideon v. Wain-
wright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Mapp "·Ohio, 
367 U.S. 643 (1961). In dicta, the Court has already established that certain features of 
the double jeopardy clause are recognized in the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. See cases cited in note 11 supra. In view of the following statement by the 
majority in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1964), it might be no step at all fully 
to incorporate the double jeopardy clause and to overrule Palko v. Con11eclicul: 
The court has thus rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to 
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present Court in favor of full incorporation of the double jeopardy clause itself.'lT 
This argument would remove existing deterrents to postconviction remedies 
across the board, not just for those who appeal from errors of constitutional 
significance. In relying upon implied acquittal of a higher penalty, rather than 
on an unconstitutional condition attached to the right of a fair trial, a double 
jeopardy rationale would have an original sentence operate as a ceiling whether 
or not the original error affected the fundamental fairness of the trial. Adoption 
of this double jeopardy rationale would involve only a slight extension of e~ 
isting doctrine, viz., an extension of Green to the facts of Stroud (as Mr. Jus~ 
tice Frankfurter foresaw and as Mr. Justice Traynor accomplished in Hctldcr~ 
son), and an extension of the fifth amendment double jeopardy protection 
through the fourteenth amendment (as many observers already anticipate). 
Given the Court's present libertarian mood, it would not be surprising if the 
double jeopardy approach were adopted.18 
AN EPILOGUE ON EQUAL PROTECTION 
Five years after its adoption, Mr. Justice Miller wrote of the equal pro~ 
tection clause : 
We doubt very much whether any action of a State not directed by way 
of discrimination against the Negroes as a class, or on account of theh· 
race, will ever be held to come within the purview of this provision.10 
Nearly sixty years after its adoption, Mr. Justice Holmes could still similarly 
deride efforts to make a great deal of the vague promises of equal protection, 
observing that "it is the usual last resort of constitutional arguments."ao But 
today resort to the equal protection clause is very frequently first among con-
stitutional arguments.81 Since 1950, litigants have achieved remarkable success 
in invalidating governmental regulations on the strength of equal protection 
claims not only on racial issues, but on the regulation of business, travel, citi-
the states only a 'watered-down, subjective version of the individual guarantees o£ 
the Bill of Rights' •.•• 
See Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright: The "Art" of Ot•crruling, 1963 SuPREME Or. Iuw. 211. 
But see Henkin, "Selective Incorporation" in the Fourteenth Amendmmt, 63 YALtl L.J, 741 
80-81 (1963). 
77. Justices Douglas and Black, in Bartkus v. I11inois, 359 U.S. 121, 151 n.1 (1959) l 
Ciucci v. Illinois, 356 U.S. 571, 575 (1958). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 4 n.2 
(1963); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345-47 (1963); Adamson v. Cali£ornln1 
332 u.s. 46,70-123 (1947). 
78. An incidental attraction of eliminating the risk of harsher resentencinff lo that 
it would take the pressure off Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963). No longer could n defend· 
ant argue that he did not exhaust his state remedies in a timely fashion ior icar that 
he would be sentenced more severely if convicted again of the same offense. 
79. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81 (1873). 
80. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 308 (1927). 
81. See Kurland, Equal in Origin and Eqttal in Title to the Legislative attd E:rcculivc 
Brallclles of the Government, 78 HARV. L. REv. 143-49 (1964) ; Kellett, The Expausiou of 
Eq11ality, 37 So. CAL. L. REv. 400 (1964). 
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zenship, voting, association, and, most portentously, the rights of the criminally 
accused respecting postconviction remedies.82 
An argument on the harsher sentencing question grounded in equal protection 
begins by conceding that no state is under a due process obligation to provide 
postconviction remedies if only a claim of non-constitutional error is involved 
in the original trial.83 It also grants that each state could establish a general 
sentence review authority empowered to review, within a reasonable time, 
sentences of any group of convicts selected according to some rational basis.st In 
the classification of convicts whose sentences are to be subject to review, how-
ever, whether by such a board or whether by any other means including a 
different judge or jury, no state is free to make that classification on an arbi-
trary basis. Equal protection of the laws must mean that those subject to the 
risk of having their sentences increased cannot be described according to some 
standard which fails rationally to distinguish them as a class from others 
whose sentences ought equally to be reviewable. Sll Thus, while a state might 
establish a board to review all sentences, or while it might limit review only 
to the sentences of those who plead guilty (because of the special likelihood 
that such sentences reflect guilty plea bargaining and are, as a class, more 
likely than others to be irregular), it manifestly could not establish a board 
empowered only to review, say, the sentences of Negroes. The constitutional 
vice of such a practice would remain even assuming that each sentence actually 
reviewed by the board were judged only according to appropriate sentencing 
criteria in which the race of the Negro convict was not considered. The point 
under the equal protection clause is simply that whether or not the particular 
sentence revision may be fair by itself, the basis for classifying the group subject 
to revised sentences would still have no rational connection with any legitimate 
interest to be served in providing for revised sentences. Whether the state's 
interest is to revise sentences more uniformly according to the rehabilitative 
character of the convict, or the need to remove him from society while he re-
mains a threat, or the need to deter others, or the tolerable felt needs of com-
munity vengeance or retribution, it is patently arbitrary to connect these in-
terests to a class selected exclusively because of its race. 
What is familiar and obvious respecting equal protection and imposing the 
risk of higher sentences on a group described by race or righthandedness, is 
arguably as obvious respecting the imposition of that risk on a group de-
82. See, e.g., Griffin v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 130 (1964) ; Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 
163 (1964) ; Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) ; Lucas v. Colorado Gen. Assembly, 
377 U.S. 713 (1964) ; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) ; Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186 (1962) ; Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) ; Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 
457 (1957) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 
(1954); Bollingv. Sharpe, 347U.S. 497 (1954). 
83. See note 25 supra. 
84. See Note, 69 YALE L.J. 1453 (1960); CoNNECilCUT GoVERNOR's PlllSON STUDY 
CoMMITTEE, FIRST INTERIM REPoRT (1956). 
85. See Whalen, Resentence Without Credit for Time Served: Uneq11al Protection 
of the Laws, 35 MINN. L. REv. 239, 249-52 (1951). 
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scribed on any other arbitrary basis, including the group consisting solely o£ 
those convicted a second time after successful appeal of their original convictions. 
In none of the states permitting harsher sentences upon retrial, is there a pro-
cedure established to increase the sentence of any other convict originally 
sentenced in accordance with the appropriate statute. The risk of a harsher 
sentence is borne exclusively by those who pursue some postconviction remedy. 
Yet there is no reason to suppose that the original sentences of this group are 
any more likely to warrant review as a class than the sentences of other convicts 
who are not subject to the same risk. The vulnerable class appears to be quite 
equivalent to a class described by race, right-handedness, indigence, or some 
other factor equally irrelevant in any proper determination of those whose 
sentences might appropriately be reviewed. 
One need not, in consequence, maintain that harsher resentencing is foru 
bidden only for those who can make a showing that the risk of such a sentence 
effectively denies their right to a fundamentally fair trial, or more generally 
by extending the double jeopardy clause on the strength of Green v. United 
States and People v. Henderson. In retrospect, an equal protection analysis of 
the Henderson case itself may be more satisfactory than the double jeopardy 
analysis actually employed by the California Supreme Court. What makes it 
especially satisfactory is that an equal protection claim draws fairly solid sup· 
port from the unexpressed considerations of the Supreme Court in reviewing 
equal protection claims. First, the current permissibiilty of harsher resentencing 
for successful appellants adversely affects a significant personal liberty,80 the 
opportunity to appeal an allegedly erroneous criminal conviction. It does so, 
as we have previously observed, by denying the appellant the protection of his 
original sentence as a condition of appealing his conviction, and thereby dis· 
couraging him from appealing. Griffin v. Illinois 87 and Douglas v. Califortlict,89 
as equal protection cases, and as sensibly taken in combination with Grem and 
N oia, may reasonably indicate that the Court will be especially vigilant in pro-
tecting access to postconviction remedies from substantial impediments. The 
dilemma confronting one who must risk a harsher penalty if he appeals his 
conviction appears to be a substantial impediment. Second, acceptance o£ an 
equal protection argument would not constitute a serious affront to an im-
portant public policy adopted after deliberate and representative legislative 
consideration. In most states, the permissibility of harsher resentencing of 
successful appellants is strictly a judicial creation, without statutory support. 
Where it may have such support, it can still scarcely be said to reflect a broad 
consensus which adequately considers the plight of an accused who is affected 
86. In such cases, the Court requires a very high standard o£ equal protection. Compare 
Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522 (1959), aml Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 
483 (1955), and Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947), with 
McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283 (1964), and Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 
(1964), aud Reynolds v. Sims, ~77 U.S. 533 (1964), aml Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 
(1956), aml Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
87. 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
88. 372 u.s. 353 (1963). 
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by the rule.89 Nor would constitutional invalidation of the rule substantially 
injure state interests in punishing the guilty, since the states would remain 
free to establish more general means for revising sentences, means which 
would not similarly discourage defendants from pursuing their postconviction 
remedies. Third, merely in terms of ordinary equal protection parlance, the 
present classification of those subject to harsher resentencing does appear 
to be arbitrary, i.e., both underinclusive and overinclusive of those whose sen-
tences ought to be subject to revision,90 or those whose original sentences 
may have been unduly lenient. 91 This is not to say that the current practice 
permitting harsher resentencing of successful appellants is so easily resolved 
as an equal protection matter as it might be, say, under the extreme e.'mlllple 
where sentences could be increased only for Negroes; the classification to which 
we have objected is not so deliberately invidious.02 Nevertheless, it has gen-
erally not been a requirement for invoking the equal protection clause that 
one impugn the motives of those responsible for the law under attack, and 
it is not necessary here to undertake an argument that the current practice is 
continued deliberately to frustrate postconviction remedies. It is enough that 
the practice has that effect, and that it is not othenvise defensible as a necessary 
means for effectuating a legitimate public policy.oa 
89. The equal protection clause has a special attraction under these circumst:mccs. 
See Mr. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Railway E.xpress Co. v. New York. 336 
U.S. 106, 111-13 (1949); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 1192, 1197-1Z02 (1961). But sec BICKEL, TDE 
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 222-28 (1962). 
90. See Tussman & tenBroek, Tlte Equal Protection of ll1c Laws, 37 CALIF. L REv. 
341 (1949). 
91. See note 38 supra and accompanying te.'Ct. 
92. See notes 21 & 22 Sllpra; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105, 114 
(1918). 
93. In Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956), there was no evidence that the require-
ment of a transcript for appeal was imposed for the purpose of disabling indigents. It 
was enough that the effect of the requirement was economically discriminatory, that it 
affected a significant (statutory) right of appeal, and that failure to provide free transcripts 
was not due to some compelling and legitimate public policy unsusceptible to satisfaction 
by less discriminatory alternative means. See also Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 
(1963). 
In Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), the invalid discrimination in favor of American 
Express Co. was merely incidental to the state's purpose of limiting the class of sellers 
to those known to be responsible. It was enough for the Court, however, that "the effect 
of the discrimination is to create a closed class," and that less repressive alternative means 
were available to carry out the state's legitimate policies. Id. at 467 (emphasis added). 
The practical (though inexplicit) result of these cases is to oblige the states to carry 
out their aims in the least discriminatory means which are feasible, especially where im-
portant private interests are at stake. See McLaughlin v. Florida, 85 Sup. Ct. 283, 291 
(1964); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 462 (1961); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 
U.S. 203, 265 (1963) (concurring opinion); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487-SS 
(1960) ; Heilberg v. Fha, 236 F. Supp. 405, 408 (N.D. Cal. 1964), ccrt. gra11lcd, 33 U.S.L 
WEEK 3202 (1965). No more than that is asked here. The states have ample means for 
assuring appropriate sentences without affecting rights of appeal in the same distressing 
fashion as they are currently affected by the risk of harsher resentencing. 
